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INTRODUCTION

The judiciary faces a difficult task in attempting to define the
proper standards of conduct for corporate directors and officers.
Although courts have enunciated various standards, the prevailing
theme has been that corporate directors and officers are fiduciaries
who have a "distinct legal relationship" with the corporation and
its shareholders.1 As fiduciaries, directors and officers must conform to the duty of care2 and the duty of loyalty.3 The business
judgment rule, which creates a presumption of propriety for directors' and officers' substantive business decisions, developed concur* This Special Project Note is cited as "Recent Developments (Special Project)"
throughout the Special Project.
1. See supra An HistoricalPerspective (Special Project) notes 2-5 and accompanying text.

2. See id. notes 9-49 and accompanying text.
3. See id. notes 115-40 and accompanying text.
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rently with these duties.4
Several recent court decisions concerning corporate director
and officer liability appear to have placed a greater duty on directors and officers to investigate, inquire, and more actively participate in corporate governance. 5 In contrast, two recent state statutory amendments have lessened the fiduciary burden on directors
and officers.6 Meanwhile, the business judgment rule remains a significant limitation on courts' ability to question the substantive
business decisions made by directors and officers. 7 These developments have evoked differing philosophical responses, the two most
notable of which are the neoclassical model8 and the monitoring
model.9
This Special Project Note will discuss recent developments in
three distinct areas of corporate law and will illustrate that many
of the developments hailed as expressing a pervasive dissatisfaction with corporate governance1 0 actually are not significant deviations from the current law, but merely are clarifications of existing
law." Part II of this Special Project Note will examine recent Delaware state court decisions and will evaluate their potential impact
on corporate law. Part III will analyze three recent cases decided in
jurisdictions outside Delaware and will compare them to Delaware
law. Finally, Part IV will discuss two recent state statutory amendments that drastically affect the traditional law governing director
and officer liability by effectively eliminating corporate directors'
and officers' duty of care.
4. See id. notes 50-79 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
6. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986); IND. CoDE ANN. § 23-1-351(e) (Burns Supp. 1986).
7. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
8. See Burgman & Cox, CorporateDirectors,Corporate Realities,and the Deliberative Process: An Analysis of the Trans Union Case," 11 J. CORP. L. 311, 342 (1986). The
neoclassical model theorizes that the monitoring devices present in the United States' economic system and in the corporate structure itself negate any need for a legal monitoring
system. See id. at 313, 342-43; see also Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35
VAND. L. REv. 1259 (1982) (discussing the proposals for change in corporate governance and
concluding that those who advocate change fail to understand the economics of the corporate system).
9. The monitoring model calls for a more active board of directors and places a legal
obligation on directors to "engage in a deliberative process with reasonably complete information." Burgman & Cox, supra note 8,at 342.
10. This perceived dissatisfaction is the basis for the ALI's proposed Principles of
Corporate Governance. See infra ALI Proposals (Special Project) notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
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RECENT DELAWARE CASE LAW

A.

Introduction

Recent Delaware state court decisions do not significantly
change traditional corporate law; instead, these decisions clarify
and explain the current standards of conduct for directors and officers. First, Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado2 creates a two-step test
for analyzing a board's motion to dismiss a properly filed shareholder derivative suit.'3 The Zapata test modifies the traditional

application of the business judgment rule.' Aronson v. Lewis,15
however, mitigates the impact of Zapata by limiting the application of its two-step test. 6 Second, Smith v. Van Gorkom" reaffirms a gross negligence standard for directors and officers under
the duty of care, yet limits application of the business judgment
rule. 8 Subsequent cases, however, have continued to apply a
highly deferential standard of review for directors' and officers' actions." Finally, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.20 employs a traditional
duty of loyalty analysis, which places the burden of proving the
essential fairness of a given transaction on the director who has an
interest on both sides of the transaction.2 '
B. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado and Aronson v. Lewis
One situation that requires courts to examine directors' actions closely is the shareholder derivative suit.2 2 Directors often are
12. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
13. For a full discussion of Zapata, see infra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.

14. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1979); see also infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
15. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
16. For a full discussion of Aronson, see infra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
17. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).

18. For a full discussion of Van Gorkom, see infra notes 48-86 and accompanying
text.

19. For a discussion of the Delaware cases decided since Van Gorkom, see infra notes
87-114 and accompanying text.

20. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
21.

For a full discussion of Weinberger, see infra notes 115-35 and accompanying

text.

22. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); see also Block & Prussin, Termination of Derivative Suits Against
Directors on Business Judgment Grounds: From Zapata to Aronson, 39 Bus. LAW. 1503
(1984). A derivative action is a suit brought by a shareholder to enforce a right properly
belonging to the corporation when, for some reason, the corporation itself fails to bring the
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named as defendants in shareholder derivative suits. Therefore, to
ensure that a board is acting in the best interests of the shareholders and the corporation, a court must scrutinize carefully a board's
motives in voting to dismiss a derivative action against a director.
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado s addressed the inherent conflicts
of interest stemming from a shareholder derivative suit by creating
a two-step test to evaluate a board's decision to dismiss a derivative suit against a director. In Zapata a shareholder, William Maldonado, brought a derivative suit alleging that Zapata's directors
breached their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders. Mr. Maldonado, however, filed the suit without first demanding that the board pursue the corporation's cause of action. 4
Mr. Maldonado argued that demand should have been "excused,"
alleging that a demand would have been futile because the directors were not sufficiently independent.2 5 Meanwhile, Zapata's
board created a special litigation committee composed of disinterested directors to determine whether to pursue the action.2 6 The
committee decided to dismiss the suit; Zapata's subsequent motion
to dismiss was granted by the trial court and Mr. Maldonado
appealed.
On appeal the Delaware Supreme Court considered whether a
special litigation committee has the power to dismiss a derivative
action. Subsequently, the corporation's board of directors may form a committee of disinterested directors-a "special litigation committee"-to determine whether to pursue or dismiss the shareholder's derivative action. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
23. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
24. Id. at 780. Zapata's board of directors created a stock option plan for certain
directors and officers, granting them the right to purchase the corporation's common stock
at $12.15 per share. Zapata also planned a self-tender offer calculated to increase the market
price of its stock from $18-19 per share to the price offered, $25 per share. The directors'
capital gains were to be measured by the difference between the option price and the fair
market value of the stock on the option's exercise date. In order to minimize their individual
federal income tax liability, the directors wanted to exercise their options before the announcement of the proposed self-tender offer and the accompanying jump in price. Thus,
they accelerated the date upon which they could exercise their options, an action that Mr.
Maldonado alleged was a breach of the directors' fiduciary duty owed to Zapata and its
shareholders. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1254-55 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd sub
nom. Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
25. For a discussion of demand-refused and demand-excused cases, see infra note 33.
26. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 781. Courts have recognized that special litigation committees composed of independent directors have the authority to investigate the merits of
shareholder derivative suits on behalf of directors who have some interest in the outcome of
an action. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1979). The business judgment rule traditionally has afforded protection to decisions by
these special litigation committees.
27. Zapata,430 A.2d at 781.
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action2 ' and concluded that the board of directors possesses that
power and may delegate that power to a committee of the board.
The significance of Zapata, however, is its limitation on the traditional protection afforded by the business judgment rule to a committee decision to dismiss derivative litigation in "demand-excused" situations. The court's analysis of the judicial deferrence
required by the business judgment rule included a two-step test to
assess the integrity of the board's motion to dismiss. 29 The court
sought to balance the board's desire to protect the corporation
from meritless claims and costly litigation with the shareholders'
need for protection against improperly motivated dismissals of
worthwhile shareholder suits. Consequently, the court modified its
application of the business judgment rule to avoid either of these
extremes.
Zapata's two-step test requires that a court (1) examine the
good faith and independence of a board's or committee's decision
to dismiss a suit,30 and (2) apply its own business judgment to determine whether the suit should be dismissed.3 1 Requiring a court
to exercise its own business judgment is a significant limitation on
the traditionally deferential business judgment rule that has been
applied to corporate decisions.3 2 This limitation, however, is restricted to the context of "demand-excused" cases.3 3 In a "de28. Id.
29. Id. at 788. The court stated:
First, the Court should inquire into the independence and good faith of the committee
and the bases supporting its conclusions ....
The second step provides, we believe, the essential key in striking the balance between legitimate corporate claims as expressed in a derivative stockholder suit and a
corporation's best interests as expressed by an independent investigating committee.
The Court should determine, applying its own independent business judgment,

whether the motion should be granted.
Id. at 788-89 (footnotes omitted).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 789.
32. See Block & Prussin, supra note 22, at 1505. For a discussion of the business
judgment rule and its application, see supra An Historical Perspective (Special Project)
notes 50-79 and accompanying text.
33. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 783. The court clearly distinguished between "demand-excused" and "demand-refused" cases. In a demand-excused case a shareholder may sue without first demanding that the board bring the action. A shareholder may bring an action
without prior demand if the directors are so interested in the action that their decision on
whether to pursue the action likely would be a "tainted" decision. Typically, demand is
excused if all or a majority of the directors participated in the questioned transaction or are
defendants in the action. Id. at 784. When a board decides not to pursue an action after a
shareholder has made a demand, the shareholder's subsequent suit is deemed demand-refused. Courts assume that the directors possess the requisite impartiality to assess fairly the
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mand-refused" case a board's decision not to pursue an action still
is entitled to the protection of the business judgement rule unless
the stockholder can show that the decision was "wrongful."3 4
Several commentators view Zapata as a significant limitation
on the great deference traditionally afforded directors' business decisions;3 5 Zapata'stwo-step test, however, is limited by Aronson v.
Lewis."6 In this subsequent Delaware case, Harry Lewis brought a
shareholder derivative suit challenging the validity of certain
transactions betweeen Meyers Parking System, Inc. and Leo Fink,
one of its directors.3 7 Mr. Lewis also named as defendants the entire board that approved the challenged transactions between Mr.
Fink and the corporation. Mr. Fink, who owned forty-seven percent of Meyers' outstanding shares, had a lucrative employment
contract with Meyers. 8 Mr. Lewis asserted that Mr. Fink dominated the board of directors through his stock ownership interest
and his alleged selection of all the Meyers directors. Mr. Lewis
claimed that the employment contract and other transactions 9 bemerits of pursuing a derivative suit if demand is not excused. Thus, a decision by disinterested directors to dismiss a suit is afforded the same business judgment rule protection
that any other business decision would receive. See id. at 783-85.
34. Id. at 783. In McKee v. Rogers, 18 Del. Ch. 81, 156 A. 191 (1931), the court held
that a shareholder may not "invade the discretionary field" of the directors when they have
decided not to pursue a claim on behalf of the corporation. Id. at 85-86, 156 A. at 193. The
Zapata court asserted that application of the business judgment rule in demand-refused
situations would not harm the shareholders because "[b]oard members, owing a well-established fiduciary duty to the corporation, will not be allowed to cause a derivative suit to be
dismissed when it would be a breach of their fiduciary duty." Zapata, 430 A.2d at 783.
35. See, e.g., Block & Prussin, supra note 22, at 1504-05. According to the authors,
Zapata exemplifies the "structural bias" viewpoint, which calls for strict criteria in determining the disinterestedness of directors. A "structural bias" favors interested directors because disinterested directors sympathize with their colleagues. Id. But see Cox, Searching
for the Corporation'sVoice in Derivative Suit Litigation:A Critiqueof Zapata and the ALI
Project, 1982 DUKE L. J. 959. Although Professor Cox applauds the court's refusal to apply
the business judgment rule, he sees the two-step test as an "illusory improvement" because
of the lenient standards for a showing of good faith by the directors. Cox, supra, at 975, 983.
The "structural bias" view is reflected more clearly in Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983). See infra notes 144-58 and accompanying text.
36. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
37. Id. at 808.
38. Mr. Fink's five-year employment contract, which contained terms for automatic
renewal, provided for an annual salary of $150,000 plus a bonus of five percent of Meyers'
pre-tax profits over $2,400,000. Mr. Fink could terminate the contract at any time, but Meyers had to give six months notice to terminate. Upon termination of the contract, Mr. Fink
would become a consultant for Meyers and would receive $150,000 per year for the first
three years, $125,000 per year for the next three years, and $100,000 per year thereafter.
The contract further provided that Mr. Fink's inability to perform any services would not
affect his compensation. Id. at 808-09.
39. In addition to the employment contract, Meyers made several interest-free loans
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tween Meyers and Mr. Fink had no valid business purpose and
were a waste of corporate assets because the amounts paid were
excessive and because Mr. Fink performed little service to the corporation. 40 Because of Mr. Fink's alleged domination of the board,
Mr. Lewis failed to make a demand on Meyers' directors to bring
the derivative action, deeming such a demand to be futile. 4 ' The
trial court denied the defendant-directors' subsequent motion to
dismiss for failure to make a demand and held that the failure was
excused because the directors could not have considered the demand impartially. 42 The directors appealed and the Delaware Supreme Court was presented an opportunity to apply Zapata's twostep test to determine whether the action should proceed. The
court, however, refused to apply the Zapata test, concluding that
Mr. Lewis had not shown that a demand would have been futile.4 3
Aronson was not a demand-excused case because demand was
not futile. The court stated that it must determine whether the
plaintiff alleged facts creating a reasonable doubt that "(1) the directors are disinterested and independent, and (2) the challenged
transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment."'44 In assessing these factors, the threat of personal
liability for approving an allegedly wrongful transaction was not
sufficient to make a director "interested" for the purpose of determining whether the decision not to pursue the action was a tainted
one.4 5 Aronson excuses demand only when directors making the
decision to terminate are "under an influence which sterilizes their
discretion," and holds that mere approval-absent evidence of a
breach of fiduciary duty or other evidence of a lack of indepento Mr. Fink. Id. at 809.
40. Id.
41. Id. According to Mr. Lewis, the following factors made demand futile: (1) all directors were named as defendants and had participated in, approved or acquiesed in, and
were personally liable for the alleged wrongdoings (i.e., they approved the challenged transactions); (2) Mr. Fink selected each director and, thus, controlled all the board's actions;
and (3) pursuing this claim would require the defendant-directors to sue themselves,
"thereby placing the conduct of this action in hostile hands and preventing its effective
prosecution." Id.
42. Id. at 809-10.
43. Id. at 816. The Aronson court stated:
We conclude that in the demand-futile [demand-excused] context a plaintiff charging
domination and control of one or more directors must allege particularized facts manifesting "a direction of corporate conduct in such a way as to comport with the wishes
or interests of the corporation (or persons) doing the controlling."
Id. (quoting Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 123 (Del. Ch. 1971)).
44. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
45. Id. at 815.
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dence or disinterestedness-is insufficient to prevent a director
from exercising a valid business judgment. The court held that Mr.
Lewis' allegations-Mr. Fink's domination of the board based on
his ownership of forty-seven percent of Meyers' outstanding stock,
Mr. Fink's personal selection of each director, and Mr. Fink's lucrative contract-were not sufficient to support a demand-futility
claim. Given the apparent sufficiency of these46allegations, Aronson
makes proving demand-futility very difficult.

Aronson greatly limits the application of Zapata's two-step
test by classifying very few cases as demand-excused. Even if the
directors are named as defendants in the action, demand will not
be excused unless self-dealing is clearly shown.47 If demand is not
excused, a shareholder must make a demand on the board of directors to pursue any claim. In this situation, the business judgment
rule will protect a board's refusal as if the Zapata test did not exist. Despite Aronson, Zapata'stwo-step test still limits the protection afforded directors under the business judgment rule in proper
demand-excused cases.
C. Smith v. Van Gorkom: the Trans Union Case
Smith v. Van Gorkom48 (the Trans Union case) is perhaps the
most important recent case concerning the duty of care and the
business judgment rule. In Trans Union the Delaware Supreme
Court refused to apply the business judgment rule to the Trans
Union directors' decision because their actions did not constitute a
valid business decision. The widespread reactions to and criticisms
of the court's holding evince its significance to corporate
governance,49
46. See Block & Prussin, supra note 22, at 1505-06. Dennis Block and Adam Prussin,
attorneys with Weil, Gotshal & Manges in New York, NY, note that:
Aronson makes it clear that demand will almost always be required unless a majority
of the Board is so directly self-interested in the challenged transaction that there is
serious doubt that the business judgment rule would protect that transaction. Selfinterest, for these purposes, is defined in terms of direct financial interest in the challenged transaction: the fact that a majority of directors voted to approve the transaction ... does not constitute the requisite self-interest and will not excuse demand.
Id. at 1506.
47. See id.
48. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
49. See, e.g., Burgman & Cox, supra note 8; Chittur, The CorporateDirector'sStandard of Care:Past, Present, and Future, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 505 (1985); Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437 (1985); Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom after Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1
(1985); Veasey & Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule in the Revised Model Act, the Trans
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The facts in Trans Union are crucial to assessing the decision's impact on the duty of care and the business judgment rule.
Trans Union, a publicly traded holding company, sought to generate sufficient income to offset its substantial investment tax credits.5° A report presented to the board of directors at its July 1980
meeting detailed four possible means of generating income. Sale of
the company, however, was not one of the alternatives listed." At a
senior management meeting a leveraged buy-out by management
was discussed briefly. Buy-out figures of between fifty and sixty
dollars per share were discussed, but no definite price was set.52
Fearing a potential conflict of interest, Jerome Van Gorkom, chairman of Trans Union, vetoed the suggestion of a leveraged buy-out
by management.
Mr. Van Gorkom approached Jay Pritzker, a takeover specialist, with a proposed sale price and financing structure on September 13, 1980.1 Two days later, Mr. Pritzker informed Mr. Van
Gorkom of his interest in the cash-out merger proposal at fifty-five
dollars per share. Mr. Pritzker and Mr. Van Gorkom met on September 18, at which time Mr. Pritzker informed Mr. Van Gorkom
that the board must act on his proposal within three days. 54 On
September 19 Mr. Van Gorkom called meetings for the following
day for both senior management and the board of directors.5 5 Mr.

Van Gorkom disclosed Mr. Pritzker's offer to senior management
but did not furnish them with a copy of the merger agreement.
Despite senior management's negative reaction to the proposed
merger," Mr. Van Gorkom presented the proposal to Trans
Union's board of directors the same day.57 The board received copUnion Case, and the ALI Project-A Strange Porridge, 63 Thx. L. REV. 1483 (1985).
50. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864-65.
51. The following four options were presented to the board: "(1) stock purchase; (2)
dividend increases; (3) a major acquisition program; and (4) combinations of the above." Id.
at 865.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 866. Mr. Pritzker was also a social acquaintance of Mr. Van Gorkom. The
proposals presented to Mr. Pritzker were assembled by Mr. Van Gorkom without consulting
senior management. Id. Mr. Van Gorkom obtained the aid of Carl Peterson, Trans Union's
Controller, to determine the feasibility of selling the company at $55 per share and directed
Mr. Peterson not to tell anyone else of his actions. Id.
54. Id. at 867.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 867-68. Mr. Peterson and Bruce Chelberg, president of Trans Union, were
the only supporters of Mr. Van Gorkom's proposal. Donald Romans, the chief financial officer, criticized the price as being too low and argued that the proposal already was more of
an "agreed merger" than it was an offer. Id.
57. Id. The board of directors consisted of five outside directors and five inside direc-
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ies of the merger agreement too late to study the transaction
before the meeting." Mr. Van Gorkom did not disclose that fiftyfive dollars per share was near the bottom of the range of fair
prices for the company or that he proposed this price. The board
was left to assume that the price had been set only after negotiation. After two hours, the board approved the merger proposal
without ever reading it.5 9 Mr. Van Gorkom executed the agreement
that night at a social function. When the merger was announced on
September 22, many of Trans Union's officers threatened to resign.
Thereafter, Mr. Van Gorkom met with Mr. Pritzker, who agreed to
modify the proposal if Mr. Van Gorkom could persuade dissident
officers to continue working for Trans Union for at least six
months after completion of the merger.6 0 The board approved the
amendments sight unseen on October 8;61 the shareholders ratified
the merger at their meeting in January 1981.62
The lower court held that the business judgment rule protected the directors' actions and found no liability on their part. 3
tors. Four of the five outside directors were corporate chief executive officers, and one was
the former dean of the University of Chicago Business School. Although none of the outside
directors were investment bankers or financial analysts, they were professional businessmen
with 53 years cumulative experience as directors of Trans Union. Id. at 894 (McNeilly, J.,
dissenting).
58. Id. at 868. The proposal provided that Mr. Pritzker would pay $55 cash for all
outstanding shares of Trans Union; that Trans Union could receive competing offers for 90
days, but could not solicit them actively; that the offer was to be accepted by September 21
(the next day); that competing bidders could be given published, but not proprietary, information; that Mr. Pritzker's obtaining financing by October 10 was a condition of the agreement; and that if the financing condition was met by Mr. Pritzker or waived by Trans
Union, Trans Union was obligated to sell Mr. Pritzker one million newly issued shares of
treasury stock for $38 per share. Id.
59. Id. at 869. The court felt that the board based its approval of the merger solely
on Mr. Van Gorkom's presentation, statements by Mr. Chelberg and Mr. Romans as to fair
price, James Brennan's legal advice, and the board's general knowledge about the history of
Trans Union stock. Mr. Brennan, retained by Mr. Van Gorkom, informed the board that
failure to accept the offer might result in a lawsuit and that Delaware law did not require
the board to seek a fairness opinion before approving the transaction.
60. Id.
61. Id. Mr. Van Gorkom did not present accurately the amendments to the board.
Mr. Van Gorkom represented that the amended agreement would allow Trans Union to
openly solicit other offers. The actual amendment, however, was more restrictive. A more
favorable offer was no longer sufficient cause for Trans Union's withdrawal from the merger
agreement. Trans Union could abandon the agreement only if it completed a merger or
entered into a merger agreement before February 10, 1981. Id. at 882. Although the purpose
of the meeting was "to amend the Merger Agreement, in a manner agreeable to Pritzker, to
permit Trans Union to conduct a 'market test,'" these amendments were not codified until
after the board had voted to approve them. Id.
62. Id. at 870.
63. The opinion of the Court of Chancery is an unreported letter opinion.
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The Delaware Supreme Court acknowledged the role of the business judgment rule in corporate governance, but refused to apply
the rule, finding that the directors had failed to reach an informed
business judgment.8 4 The court stated that the business judgment
rule is not applicable until there has been a showing that the board
reached an informed business decision. 5 The court did not focus
on the board's ultimate substantive decision; rather, the court
scrutinized the process by which the directors reached their decision and concluded that their gross negligence during this process
prevented them from making a valid business judgment. The court
imposed on the board a duty to inquire and obtain "all information that was reasonably available to them.

66

The court did not

deviate from the gross negligence standard usually applied in duty
of care cases; rather, it found that the directors were grossly negligent because they "failed to act with informed reasonable deliberation.

'67

The business judgment rule did not apply because the di-

rectors never made an informed business judgment. The Trans
Union court's concentration on a process-oriented approach permits courts to assess the amount of care exercised by a board of
directors in reaching its decision. Trans Union directs a court's attention to the directors' decisionmaking process and clarifies the
existing gross negligence standard.
The court also examined whether later actions by the board or
shareholders cured the directors' negligence. The court found the
board's subsequent conduct in "approving" amendments based
solely on Mr. Van Gorkom's representations to be grossly negligent.68 Likewise, the shareholders' subsequent ratification of the
64. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 871-72.
65. The court summarized its reasons for not applying the business judgment rule as
follows:
The directors (1) did not adequately inform themselves as to Van Gorkom's role in
forcing the "sale" of the Company and in establishing the per share purchase price; (2)
were uninformed as to the intrinsic value of the Company; and (3) given these circumstances, at a minimum, were grossly negligent in approving the "sale" of the Company
upon two hours' consideration, without prior notice, and without the exigency of a crisis or emergency.
Id. at 874.
66. Id. at 877.
67. Id. at 881.
68. Id. at 882-83. The court also found fault with Mr. Van Gorkom's handling of an
offer made by Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. (KKR) subsequent to the board's approval
of the merger agreement with Mr. Pritzker. Mr. Van Gorkom received a formal letter from
KKR on December 2 offering to purchase 100% of Trans Union's assets and assume its
liabilities for up to $60 per share. Mr. Van Gorkom felt the financing condition in the offer
prevented it from being a firm offer and refused to issue a press release announcing KKR's
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merger agreement did not cure the directors' earlier errors.6 9
Before shareholder ratification can cure a wrongful transaction, the
shareholders must be fully informed of "all facts germane to the
transaction at issue in an atmosphere of complete candor. '70 The
court held that Trans Union's proxy materials did not fully inform
ratification of the
the shareholders; therefore, the shareholders'
71
merger agreement did not validate it.
The majority and dissenting opinions in Trans Union have
been interpreted in several ways. By imposing on directors a more
stringent duty to inquire and investigate, the majority may have
adopted the "monitoring approach" embraced in the American
Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance.7" In contrast,
both dissenting opinions felt that the court erred in not applying
the business judgment rule. The dissents, therefore, arguably exemplify a more deferential view, similar to the "neoclassical
model" of corporate governance." Justice McNeilly, however,
claimed that he dissented merely because he disagreed with the
majority's evidentiary conclusions.7 4 Justice McNeilly felt that the
majority focused on negative aspects of the transaction and igoffer. KKR withdrew the offer within hours, allegedly because one of the purchasers withdrew from the group. Mr. Van Gorkom did not inform the board of KKR's proposal at its
meeting later that afternoon. Id. at 884-85.
69. "The parties tacitly agreed that a discovered failure of the Board to reach an
informed business judgment in approving the merger constituted a voidable, rather than a
void, act." Id. at 889. The directors argued that because the transaction was voidable, subsequent ratification by the shareholders would validate the agreement between Mr. Pritzker
and Trans Union. The court rejected this argument.
70. Id. at 890.
71. The court relied on the following deficiencies in the proxy materials: (1) the
board's lack of information regarding the value of the corporation was not disclosed; (2) the
failure to assess the premium offered was not disclosed; (3) the account of events preceeding
the September 20 meeting was not complete; and (4) the supplemental proxy statement
contained information that was available for inclusion in the original proxy statement, but
that was not revealed in the original proxy statement. Id. at 890-92.
72.

See

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCEL ANALYSIS

AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(Tent. Draft No. 4, Apr. 12, 1985). This view favors greater examination of directors' and
officers' actions. See infra ALl Proposals (Special Project) notes 49-77 and accompanying
text (discussing the Principles of Corporate Governance).
73. For a discussion of these two views, see supra notes 8-9.
74. Justice McNeilly stated as follows:
I have no quarrel with the majority's analysis of the business judgment rule. It is the
application of that rule to these facts which is wrong. An overview of the entire record,
rather than the limited view of bits and pieces which the majority has exploded like
popcorn, convinces me that the directors made an informed business judgment which
was buttressed by their test of the market.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 897 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
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nored any evidence of due care on the part of the directors. 75 Jus-

tice McNeilly's dissent illustrates that Trans Union's facts are
subject to several interpretations. The majority and dissenting
opinions, therefore, do not necessarily espouse opposite views on
the role of the business judgment rule.
Various commentators have noted that the Delaware Supreme
Court's decision in Trans Union can be interpreted to lead to at
least four different results. 17 First, Trans Union may represent an
adoption of the monitoring model set forth in the ALI's Principles
of Corporate Governance," in which case the court simply reacted
to its dissatisfaction with the great discretion afforded directors
and officers under the business judgment rule.78 According to this
view, Trans Union's retention of the gross negligence standard and
its emphasis on the process by which directors reached a decision
are consistent with current Delaware law. 79 Second, Trans Union
may be a significant change in Delaware law and an end to Delaware's "race to the bottom."80 Third, the Delaware Supreme Court
may have erred in refusing to apply the business judgment rule to
75. Justice McNeilly cited, as factors to be considered, the collective experience of
the board, see supra note 57, the board's reservation of the right to accept a better offer, an
outside study of Trans Union conducted by the Boston Consulting Group, and the adequacy
of the proxy statement in informing the shareholders of the proposed transaction. Id. at
894-96 (McNeilly, J., dissenting). Justice McNeilly further argued that the board's experience, combined with their business backgrounds, contradicted the majority's conclusion that
the board's hasty decision was one made without due care:
Directors of this caliber are not ordinarily taken by a "fast shuffle." I submit they were
not taken into this multi-million dollar corporate transaction without being fully informed and aware of the state of the art as it pertained to the entire corporate panoroma of Trans Union.... These men knew Trans Union like the back of their hands
and were more than well qualified to make on the spot informed business judgments
concerning the affairs of Trans Union including a 100% sale of the corporation.
Id. at 894-95 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
76. See, e.g., Burgman & Cox, supra note 8; Fischel, supra note 49; Manning, supra
note 49. Dierdre Burgman, an attorney with Cahill, Gordon & Reindel in New York, NY,
and Professor Cox recognize the following two interpretations of Trans Union:
There are two ways of viewing Trans Union. One view concludes, as have some commentators, that the Delaware Supreme Court is out of touch with how corporate business is conducted. The other view assumes that the Delaware Supreme Court does understand "corporate realities" and is attempting to mold the law both to reflect and
reform these realities.
Burgman & Cox, supra note 8, at 313.
77. See infra ALI Proposals (Special Project) notes 49-77 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Burgman & Cox, supra note 8, at 313.
79. See id. at 328.
80. See Chittur, supra note 49, at 527. In general, Delaware law has placed minimal
standards on corporate directors and has made incorporating in Delaware a simple procedure. This leniency has made Delaware a leader among the states in the "race to the bottom" of corporate law.
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the directors' actions."1 Consequently, directors will be less likely
to take risks to further the interests of their corporations, fearing
potential liability for mistaken business judgments.8 a Finally,
Trans Union may be insignificant regardless of whether it changes
Delaware law, and its requirements may have little substantive effect, because directors can prove that they exercised due care in
reaching their business decisions by paying an expert to evaluate
the "fair" value of a corporation" and by creating a voluminous
paper record of all deliberations.8 4
Despite these various responses, Trans Union does not forsake
completely the traditional standards for the duty of care and the
business judgment rule. 5 The business judgment rule still applies
in all cases except those in which a court determines that the directors were grossly negligent in fulfilling their duty of care. With
the proper precautions, a board can easily demonstrate that it was
not grossly negligent. Thus, the Van Gorkom court appears to be
clarifying existing standards rather than creating new ones. 86
81. See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 49, at 1438; see also id. at 1455 (referring to Trans
Union as "one of the worst decisions in the history of corporate law"). Professor Fischel
states that the expenses of obtaining an expert's evaluation of each contemplated transaction and the loss of revenue resulting from directors' fear of risky or aggressive agreements
are costs that will affect the corporate shareholders more than anyone else. Id. at 1453.
82. See id. at 1453.
83. See id.
84. See Manning, supra note 49, at 9-13. Bayless Manning, an attorney with Paul,
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison in New York, NY, believes that directors can comply
with the Van Gorkom court's requirements by making copies of all documents and keeping
a written record of all steps in a given transaction, including the minutes of all meetings.
85. See Comment, Mining the Safe Harbor?: The Business Judgment Rule after
Trans Union, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 545 (1985).
The Trans Union decision did not break new ground or introduce radical theories.
Rather, it followed the basic standards for the application of the business judgment
rule established in Aronson u. Lewis; namely, that the defense afforded by the rule will
be lost if the directors do not act to inform themselves properly prior to making business decisions.
Id. at 567 (footnotes omitted).
86. See Prickett, An Explanation of Trans Union to 'Henny-Penny' and Her
Friends, 10 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 451 (1985). William Prickett, an attorney with Prickett, Jones,
Elliot, Kristol & Schnee in Delaware and the attorney for the plaintiff in Van Gorkom,
states:
First, the court could not in the light of pre-existing Delaware law decide the Trans
Union appeal in any other way, faced with the truly horrendous factual record. Second,
the Trans Union opinion does not modify or change existing Delaware law in any dramatic way: on the contrary, Trans Union simply reaffirms and applies well known legal
principles long since plainly stated in familiar Delaware cases. Third, Trans Union was
not only correctly decided, but is sound precedent reaffirming the basic obligation of
due care owed by corporate directors to stockholders.
Id. at 452.
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D. Since Trans Union
Three subsequent Delaware cases illustrate the effect of Trans
Union on Delaware corporation law. First, Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 87 applied the business judgment rule to directors' actions,
even in the presence of allegations of self-interest. The Unocal
court, however, required directors to show the reasonableness of
their actions before applying the rule in a takeover context.8 Second, Moran v. Household International,Inc.89 reaffirmed and applied Unocal's "reasonableness" test. Finally, Revlon v. McAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.90 refused to apply the business
judgment rule and imposed liability on directors who breached
their duty of care in creating a lock-up option to avoid a hostile
takeover.
Unocal concerned the attempted takeover of Unocal Corporation by Mesa, 91 who owned thirteen percent of Unocal's stock.
Mesa presented Unocal with a front-loaded, two-tiered tender offer 92 that Unocal's board of directors93 rejected as "grossly inadequate.

'9 4

The Unocal board then made a self-tender offer for forty-

nine percent of its outstanding shares to all shareholders except
Mesa. Mesa brought an action challenging the validity of the selftender offer.
The Unocal court's analysis focused on two questions: (1)
whether the board had the authority to oppose the takeover threat;
and (2) whether the business judgment rule protected the board's
action. 5 The court found that the board had a duty to protect
Unocal's shareholders and, therefore, had the authority to oppose
87. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
88. See infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
89. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
90. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
91. "Mesa" was composed of Mesa Petroleum Co., Mesa Asset Co., Mesa Partners II,
and Mesa Eastern, Inc.
92. Mesa offered to purchase approximately 37% of the outstanding shares of Unocal
at $54 per share. The remaining publicly held shares would be eliminated in exchange for
subordinate securities purportedly worth $54 per share. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949.
93. Eight of Unocal's thirteen directors were outside directors. The remaining five
were officers. Id. at 950.
94. Id. At the Unocal board of directors meeting, the board received detailed
presentations regarding the valuation of Unocal, whose value was determined to be in excess
of $60 per share. Unocal's legal counsel presented various defensive strategies available to
the corporation, one of which was a defensive self-tender offer for $70 to $75 per share.
Unocal's outside directors met with Unocal's financial advisors and agreed to reject Mesa's

offer. Id.
95.

Id. at 953.
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the takeover attempt with a selective self-tender offer. The court,
however, recognized that it should not apply the business judgement rule unquestioningly because of the inherent conflicts of interest for directors opposing the hostile takeover attempt. The
court stated that before it would apply the business judgment rule,
the "directors must show that they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed
because of another person's stock ownership."96 Directors may satisfy this burden through a showing of good faith and reasonable
investigation.9 7 The reasonableness of both the directors' apprehensions and their reactions to the threat posed are important
tests of a board's good faith." The Unocal court concluded that
the business judgment rule protected the directors' decisions from
judicial second-guessing unless Mesa could show that the directors
were motivated by self-interest, fraud, or bad faith.9
Unlike Unocal, Moran concerned a defensive maneuver prior
to any takeover attempt. Acting through its board of directors,
Household International, Inc. adopted a "Rights Plan" 100 providing each common stockholder with a preferred stock purchase option. The board adopted this plan not in response to a hostile
tender offer, but rather to prevent future takeover attempts. 10 1 The
court found that the board had the authority to adopt such a plan
and that the business judgment rule protected the directors' actions even though the plan was not in response to a tender offer. 102
The court reaffirmed Unocal's "reasonableness" test for determining a board's good faith as a prerequisite to applying the business
96. Id. at 955. Whereas Unocal placed the initial burden on the directors, Hanson
Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisitions, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986), placed the initial
burden on the plaintiff. See infra notes 176-96 and accompanying text.
97. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
98. Id. Approval of the action by a majority of outside directors also is evidence of
the board's good faith.
99. Id. at 958.
100. The Rights Plan, commonly referred to as a "poison pill," provided that stockholders receive one Right per share of common stock upon the occurrence of one of two
triggering events. If a bidder announced a tender offer for 30% of Household's stock, the
Rights were issued and were exercisable immediately to purchase 1/100 share of a new preferred stock for $100. They also were redeemable for 50 cents per Right. Thus, upon a
merger the Right holder could purchase $100 of Household common stock for $50. In addition, if anyone acquired 20% of Household's shares, the Rights were issued, became nonredeemable, and became exercisable to purchase 1/100 share of preferred stock. If the Right
was not exercised and a merger later occurred, the holder could exercise each Right to
purchase $200 of common stock of the tender offeror for $100. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1349.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1355-56.

1987]

DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY

judgment rule.
Revlon concerned a board of directors' defensive reaction to
an actual tender offer. Pantry Pride, Inc. announced a hostile
tender offer for Revlon, Inc. that Revlon's board considered grossly
inadequate.1 03 The Revlon board advised the stockholders to reject
the offer and instituted its own tender offer for up to ten million
shares in exchange for notes and preferred stock."' While Pantry
Pride continued to make offers for Revlon's shares, Revlon agreed
to a leveraged buy-out by Forstmann Little & Co.' The buy-out
agreement included a lock-up option for Forstmann to purchase
certain assets and a cancellation fee to be paid to Forstmann if the
transaction was not completed. 108
The Revlon court found that the leveraged buy-out agreement
breached the directors' duty of care and, thus, was not protected
by the business judgment rule.107 According to the court, because a
board's opposition to a threatened takeover may be motivated by
the directors' self-interest, these directors bear the burden of proving the reasonableness of their opposition and of their subsequent
actions. 1 Because Forstmann's offer was not significantly different from Pantry Pride's, the board could not reasonably claim that
its actions were a response to an offer that would affect Revlon's
shareholders adversely. Thus, the directors did not act reasonably
to protect the shareholders' interests by entering into an agreement with Forstmann.10 9
Unocal illustrates that Delaware courts still adhere to the business judgment rule. The court's two-element threshold test, 0
which scrutinizes directors' apprehensions over and reactions to
103.

Pantry Pride first proposed a friendly acquisition priced between $42 and $43 per

share. When Revlon's chairman opposed the transaction, Pantry Pride announced a hostile
tender offer at $47.50 per share. Revlon's investment banker advised the corporation that
Pantry Pride's offers were grossly inadequate. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176-77.
104. Under the Note Purchase Rights Plan, each shareholder was to receive one Note
Purchase Right for each share of common stock. The Right, which entitled the holder to
exchange each share of common stock for a $65 principal note, would take effect when anyone acquired 20% of Revlon's shares unless the acquirer purchased all the stock for no less
than $65 per share. The Rights were not made available to the acquirer. The Notes issued
contained covenants limiting Revlon's ability to incur additional debt. Id. at 177.
105. Forstmann Little & Co. is the affiliated limited partnership of Revlon's board of
directors.
106. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178.
107. Id. at 185.
108. Id. at 180 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (1985)).

109. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184-85.
110. See Comment, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 72 VA. L. REv. 851, 866
(1986); see also supra text accompanying note 98.
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perceived threats, is similar to Trans Union's inquiry into the reasonableness of a board's decisionmaking process."1 The court emphasized good faith and reasonableness, but exhibited a highly deferential attitude toward directors' actions, especially in light of the
discriminatory nature of the self-tender offer and the doubt concerning the directors' motives for opposing Mesa's offer." 2
Moran followed the Unocal analysis closely. Moran was an opportunity for the Delaware Supreme Court to apply its Trans
Union criteria to the self-interest/duty of loyalty area." 3 The
court, however, simply reiterated the reasonableness test set forth
in Unocal and applied the business judgment rule. It appears that
placing the initial burden on directors to show the reasonableness
of their actions does little to limit the broad discretion afforded
directors by the business judgment rule.
The Revlon court's refusal to apply the business judgment rule
illustrates that the initial burden placed on directors by the Trans
Union court is an actual burden. Both Unocal and Moran discuss
this burden, but both cases find that the directors met the burden
despite evidence of self-interest. Revlon is proof that the court's
decision in Trans Union is neither an aberration nor limited to the
4
particular facts of that case.1
E.

Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.

The Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed the duty of loyalty
requirement for directors and officers in Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc. 35 The Weinberger court held that when a director is involved
on both sides of a transaction, the director has the burden of proving the transaction's "essential fairness.""" The court also created
111. One commentator states:
In doctrinal terms, the Delaware Supreme Court's approach raises a new barrier to the
directors' invocation of the business judgment rule in tender offer defenses, but the
court's application of this new doctrine to the Unocal facts suggests that not much has
really changed. The court's rhetoric and characterization of the facts reflects the continued permissiveness of the Delaware courts in reviewing the actions of corporate
officers.
Comment, supra note 110, at 872.
112. See id. at 873.
113. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 49, at 5.
114. For example, the directors in Trans Union read neither the Merger Agreement
nor the Amendments before approving them; this may have influenced greatly the court's
decision in Trans Union. Revlon shows that these facts alone were not determinative in the
Trans Union court's decision.
115. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
116. See id. at 710.

19871

DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY

649

a new appraisal remedy for plaintiffs"1 7 and discarded the "business purpose test" set forth in Singer v. Magnavox, Inc."5s
In Weinberger Signal Companies, Inc. proposed to acquire
control of UOP, Inc. by purchasing UOP's stock at twenty-one dollars per share. 19 UOP's board informed its shareholders that Signal's price was not objectionable based on the fact that UOP's
stock had been trading at just under fourteen dollars per share.
Signal's offer for over fifty percent of UOP's outstanding shares
was successful, thus allowing Signal to elect six directors to UOP's
board of thirteen directors. Five of these new directors were directors or employees of Signal.. 20 When UOP's president and chief
executive officer resigned, Signal replaced him with James Crawford, a senior executive vice-president of a Signal wholly owned
subsidiary. Subsequently, Mr. Crawford became a director of both
Signal and UOP.
Signal later decided to acquire the remaining outstanding
shares of UOP. Signal's executive committee agreed to undertake a
cash-out merger for these shares at between twenty and twentyone dollars per share.12' Charles Arledge and Andrew Chitiea, each
a director of both Signal and UOP, conducted a feasibility study
prior to the committee's agreement and determined that a price of
up to twenty-four dollars per share would be a good investment for
Signal. Mr. Arledge and Mr. Chitiea never disclosed this upper
limit to UOP's non-Signal directors. 2 Subsequently, Signal's
board adopted a unanimous resolution authorizing the merger,
subject to approval by a majority of UOP's outstanding minority
shares.12 3 UOP's non-Signal directors adopted a resolution to ac117. Id. at 714.
118. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). The "business purpose test" requires a director or officer to show, in addition to fairness, that the transaction in question had a valid business
purpose.
119. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 704. Signal originally proposed a price of $19 per share.
The purchase agreement called for Signal to purchase 1,500,000 shares of UOP's authorized
but unissued shares. Signal's purchase was contingent on its success in a tender offer for
4,300,000 publicly held UOP shares at $21 per share. After the acquisition, Signal would
possess 50.5% of UOP's outstanding shares. Id.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 705. Mr. Crawford never inquired into the fairness of the price offered
by Signal.
122. Id. at 705, 707.
123. The resolution set the price at $21 per share and provided that the minority of
shares approving the merger must, when added to Signal's 50.5% ownership interest, total
at least two-thirds of all UOP shares in order for the merger to be approved. Id. at 707.
UOP approved the agreement within four business days. Id. at 711.
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cept Signal's offer on the same day."' UOP sent a letter to its
shareholders advising them of Signal's offer and urged approval of
the merger in its proxy statement. 12 5 Over fifty-one percent of the
total minority shares approved the merger. William Weinberger,
one of UOP's minority shareholders, brought an action for recission of the merger or money damages, alleging that the merger
failed the business purpose test.
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Chancery Court's
decision126 upholding the validity of the cash-out merger. The
court's reversal rested largely on the failure of the directors who
served on the boards of both Signal and UOP to disclose the findings of the feasibility study to both boards. 27 The court found the
contents of the study to be of material significance to UOP and
determined that the failure to share the report with UOP directors
constituted a breach of the duty of loyalty 28 by the directors who
served on both boards. Instead of invoking Singer's business purpose rubric, the Weinberger court applied the traditional duty of
loyalty test, which requires directors who are on both sides of a
transaction to bear the burden of establishing "their utmost good
faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain." 2 9
The court concluded that a director of two corporations owes the
same duty of loyalty to both corporations.
Rather than perpetuate the Singer analysis, Weinberger reaffirmed the essential fairness test for the duty of loyalty. A director
must show two distinct elements to prove essential fairness: (1) fair
dealing; and (2) fair price. 3 0 Signal's exclusive use of the feasibility
124. Id. at 711.
125. Id. at 708. The proxy statement disclosed neither the feasibility study conducted
by Mr. Arledge and Mr. Chitiea nor the failure of UOP's directors to suggest any price other
than that offered by Signal.
126. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981).
127. The court stated that it was "clear from the record that neither Arledge nor Chitiea shared [the feasibility study] with their fellow directors of UOP. We are satisfied that
no one else did either. This conduct hardly meets the fiduciary standards applicable to such
a transaction." Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 708.
128. For a discussion of the duty of loyalty, see supra An HistoricalPerspective (Special Project) notes 115-40 and accompanying text. Simply stated, a director or officer owes
an undivided loyalty to the corporation and is bound not to compromise that loyalty with
self-interest.
129. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 (citing Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57
(Del. 1952)).
130. The Weinberger court explained the two requirements as follows:
[Fair dealing] embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the
directors and the stockholders were obtained. The [fair price] aspect of fairness relates
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study and its failure to disclose the existence of the report precluded a finding of fair dealing.13 ' The court remanded the issue of
fair price to the trial court to enable a jury to consider the plaintiff's evidence alleging that the shares were worth twenty-six dollars per share. 3' 2 In determining the plaintiff's damages, the court
stated that the trial court should consider all relevant factors, including rescissory damages. 13 3 This new, liberalized appraisal proceeding will allow a court to use any valuation method "generally
considered acceptable in the financial community."' 3 4 The court
concluded that this expanded appraisal remedy, coupled with the
dual fairness analysis, provides minority shareholders with sufficient protection to obviate the need for Singer's additional busi1 35
ness purpose test.
F.

Conclusion

Despite the claims of some commentators, recent Delaware
state court decisions have not drastically altered Delaware corporation law. The familiar duty of care, duty of loyalty, and business
judgment rule concepts remain intact. Rather than placing a
greater standard of care on directors, Trans Union merely defines
what constitutes gross negligence. Rather than eliminate the business judgment rule, Zapata and cases subsequent to Trans Union
merely demand that a court not apply the rule automatically without examining the directors' actions. Rather than perpetuate the
Singer analysis, Weinberger reaffirms the essential fairness test for
the duty of loyalty. Thus, these recent cases tend to clarify rather
than change existing law.
III.

CASE LAW OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Three recent cases decided outside Delaware illustrate how
other state courts either have followed or modified Delaware law.
to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other elements

that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company's stock.
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
131. Id. at 711-12.
132. Id. at 712-14. The issue of fair value is important in determining the amount of a
plaintiff's recovery.
133. Id. at 714.
134. Id. at 713; see also Note, Minority Shareholders and Cash-out Mergers:The Delaware Court Offers Plaintiffs Greater Protectionand a ProceduralDilemma, 59 WASH. L.
REV. 119, 121 (1983).
135. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715.
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In Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc.136 the Iowa Supreme Court adopted the structural bias approach' 37 and refused
to give a corporation's defendant-directors the power to confer the
authority to dismiss a stockholder derivative suit on a special litigation committee.13 8 In contrast, the North Carolina Supreme
Court, in Alford v. Shaw," 9 held that the business judgment rule
protects a special litigation committee's decision to dismiss a derivative suit.' 40 In Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisitions,
Inc.'4 1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
in a decision contrary to Delaware law,' 42 placed the initial burden
of proving a director's43breach of fiduciary duty in a takeover situation on the plaintiff.'
A.

Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc.

In Miller the Iowa Supreme Court recognized the potential for
bias if directors who are defendants in a shareholder derivative
suit are permitted to appoint a special litigation committee and
44
confer upon that committee the authority to dismiss the suit.'
Instead, the court required that the defendant-directors ask the
a "special panel" to determine whether to pursue
court to appoint
145
the action.
In Miller a shareholder brought a derivative suit in federal
district court against the directors of Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., alleging harm to the corporation from the corporation's
sale of its stock at fraudulently low prices.' 46 While the action was
pending in federal court, the four defendant-directors expanded
the board to six members, appointed the two new directors to a
136. 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983).
137. Id. at 716-18. For a discussion of the structural bias approach, see supra note 35.
138. Thus, the Iowa view rejects Delaware's Zapata opinion, which upholds the validity of a special litigation committee appointed by the board of directors. See supra notes 2324 and accompanying text.
139. 318 N.C. 289, 349 S.E.2d 41 (1986).
140. Id. The New York Court of Appeals previously adopted this position in Auerbach
v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). The Delaware Supreme
Court, however, rejected application of the traditional business judgment rule to decisions of
special litigation committees in Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
141. 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying New York law).
142. See Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); supra notes 96-97
and accompanying text.
143. Hanson, 781 F.2d at 273.
144. Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983).
145. Id. at 718.
146. Id. at 710.
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special litigation committee, and conferred upon this committee
the authority to control the action. 14 7 Register & Tribune subsequently moved for summary judgment, claiming that the committee had determined that the action was not in the best interests of
the corporation." 8 The federal court certified the question to the
Iowa Supreme Court and directed the Iowa court to apply Iowa
law in deciding whether the defendant-directors of a corporation
have the authority to appoint a special litigation committee with
149
the power to conduct a shareholder derivative suit.
The Iowa Supreme Court concluded that under the Iowa Business Corporation Act, a corporation may appoint a special litigation committee and confer upon it the power to conduct a derivative suit if the directors appointing the members of the committee
are independent and if the corporation's charter and by-laws authorize the action.1 50 The court found that Register & Tribune's
charter and by-laws allowed delegation to a special litigation committee,' 5' but the court refused to recognize this authority when
the directors appointing the committee were defendants in an action. 5 2 The court found support for this proposition in the ALI's
147. The board adopted the following resolution:
RESOLVED, that the committee shall:
1. Conduct such investigation of the circumstances surrounding all matters referred to, or which may be referred to, in the action Paul B.W. Miller vs. The Register
and Tribune Syndicate, Inc., et al . . . as the committee deems necessary or desirable
to determine whether the corporation or anyone acting on the corporation's behalf shall
undertake or continue any litigation against one or more of the present or former
Directors...
2. Make the determination contemplated in 1 above, in the exercise of the committee's business judgment and in good faith; and
3. Undertake and supervise any action necessary or appropriate to implement any
such determination; and further. ..
RESOLVED, that the determination made by the Independent Litigation Committee
shall be final, shall not be subject to review by the Board of Directors, and shall in all
respects be binding on the corporation.
Id. at 711.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 714.
151. Id. at 715. The relevant provisions within Register & Tribune's charter and bylaws are as follows: (1) Article IV § 2 of the charter: "The board of directors may also
appoint such assistant officers, superintendents, managers, and other agents, as may be authorized by the by-laws or by resolution of the board of directors. ... ."; and (2) Bylaw §
3.3: "The Board of Directors, by resolution, may designate from among its members and
such other committees of the Board of Directors, each of which shall have and may exercise
such authority of the Board of Directors as the resolution of the Board of Directors may
provide." Id.
152. The court explained:
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Principles of Corporate Governance, which require that independent directors appoint special litigation committees. 153 The court
further held that defendant-directors may not appoint a special
committee to conduct the action. Instead, the court proposed that
these defendant-directors ask the court to appoint a special panel
to conduct the litigation.
Commentators have criticized the court's decision for two reasons. First, the court failed to formulate a clear test to determine
when a special panel should be used.154 The court stated only that
a corporation must request a panel when its directors lack sufficient "independence.' 1 55 Defendant-directors clearly lack independence, but the court stated that directors may lack independence
even if they are not named in a suit.1 56 Thus, future Iowa courts
are left to determine, without clear guidance, when directors are
not "independent" and, consequently, are not able to appoint a litigation committee. 57 Second, the court failed to establish the level
of judicial deference that courts should give to a panel's decision
1 58
not to pursue a derivative suit.
B.

Alford v. Shaw

Although the Iowa Supreme Court was suspicious of special
litigation committees and their potential decisions not to pursue
shareholder derivative suits, 5 other jurisdictions have continued
to apply a traditional business judgment rule analysis to these decisions. 6 0 For example, in Alford v. Shaw' the North Carolina
It is tacitly, if not expressly, conceded by the defendant corporation and the defendant
directors in the present case that the board itself could not seek dismissal of the action
against the majority of its own members by invoking the business judgment rule. The
question which naturally arises is whether, given this circumstance, the board has the
power to delegate to a committee the authority to do that which it may not do itself.
Id. at 716.
153. Id. at 717.
154. See Comment, Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, A New Approach to Special Litigation Committees?, 9 J. CORP. L. 981, 989 (1984).
155. Miller, 336 N.W.2d at 718.
156. Id. at 718 & n.3.
157. See id. (stating that "wherever we have used the term 'independent director' in
our discussion.., we have intended to encompass directors completely free from any dual
relationship which prevents an unprejudiced exercise of judgment").
158. See Comment, supra note 154, at 989.
159. See Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983);
supra notes 144-58 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1979).
161. 318 N.C. 289, 349 S.E.2d 41 (1986).
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Supreme Court recently held that the business judgment rule protects special litigation committees' decisions.1 62
In Alford the All American Assurance Company (AAA)
adopted a resolution establishing a special litigation committee
empowered to conduct derivative actions.6 ' In 1982 minority
shareholders brought suit against AAA, alleging that the directors
had engaged in unlawful and fraudulent transactions to the detriment of the corporation. 164 The special litigation committee investigated the allegations and recommended that some of the claims
be settled and that the remaining claims not be asserted. Pursuant
to the committee's recommendation, AAA settled the specified
claims, moved for approval of the settlement agreement, and
moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims.6 5 The district court granted summary judgment, applying the business judgment rule to the committee's decision to dismiss the cliams. The
court of appeals reversed and applied the rule established in Miller
v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc.,166 which states that defendant-directors cannot confer the authority to conduct a derivative
suit on a litigation committee. The North Carolina Supreme Court,
however, reversed.
The North Carolina Supreme Court discussed the following
conflicting views surrounding judicial deference to special litigation
committees' decisions:16 7 (1) Auerbach's application of the traditional business judgment rule; 68 (2) Zapata's application of the
business judgment rule in demand-refused cases and its applica162. The North Carolina Court of Appeals previously refused to apply the business
judgment rule to a special litigation committee's decision to dismiss an action in which the
directors allegedly breached their fiduciary duty. Alford v. Shaw, 72 N.C. App. 537, 540, 324
S.E.2d 878, 881 (1985), rev'd, 318 N.C. 289, 349 S.E.2d 41 (1986).
163. Alford, 318 N.C. at 290, 349 S.E.2d at 42.
164. These allegedly unlawful and fraudulent transactions included:
[1] failing to exercise an option to purchase shares of AAA stock from Great Commonwealth Life Insurance Company (GCL) and a failure to exercise a "put" to sell shares
of AAA stock to American Commonwealth Financial Corporation (ACFC); [2] paying
excessive amounts to affiliate companies for administrative expenses; [3] entering into
certain allegedly improper reinsurance and co-insurance agreements; [4] redeeming certain 81 debentures held by affiliated companies; [5] releasing American Bank and
Trust Company (ABTC), Baton Rouge, Louisiana, from an obligation to purchase an
office building; and [6] engaging in other allegedly improper transactions with affiliates,
including unsecured loans and joint ownership of airplanes.
Id. at 292, 349 S.E.2d at 44.

165. Id. at 292, 349 S.E.2d at 43.
166.

See supra notes 144-58 and accompanying text.

167.

See Alford, 318 N.C. at 294-95, 349 S.E.2d at 49-50.

168. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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tion of a two-step test in demand-excused cases;"6 9 and (3) Miller's
view that defendant-directors are not competent to appoint a valid
litigation committee.17 0 The Alford court summarily rejected
Miller's view because it was not "in the best interests" of North
Carolina's corporate community." 1 The court also rejected
Zapata's two-step test, concluding that this two-step analysis was
merely an "illusory improvement" because it lacked a clear standard to determine how a court should apply its own business judgment. 7 2 Instead, the court adopted the Auerbach view and applied
the business judgment rule to the special litigation committee's decisions. The court limited its inquiry to whether the committee
had been composed of independent directors who acted in good
faith.'
The court, however, modified Auerbach's approach and
placed the burden of proving disinterestedness and independence
on the defendants. 7 Thus, in North Carolina defendant-directors
must affirmatively show their independence and good faith; they
17 5
cannot rely on the plaintiff's failure to show bad faith.
C. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisitions, Inc.
In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.17 6 the Delaware Su-

preme Court emphasized that, under Delaware law, defendant-directors acting in a takeover context have the initial burden of
showing the reasonableness of their actions. In Hanson Trust PLC
v. ML SCM Acquisitions, Inc.,' however, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that, under New York law,
the plaintiff bears this burden.7
In Hanson, Hanson Trust PLC, a corporation of the United
Kingdom, announced a tender offer for the common stock of SCM,
169. See supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 144-58 and accompanying text.
171. Alford, 318 N.C. at 295, 349 S.E.2d at 50. The court did not explain why such a
view was not "in the best interests" of the state's corporate community.
172. Id. at 296-97, 349 S.E.2d at 52.
173. Id.
174. Id. "We believe that careful application of this modified Auerbach rule to determine the disinterested independence and good faith of the committee members and the
appropriateness and sufficiency of the investigative procedures provides sufficient judicial
safeguards." Id.
175. Id. at 297, 349 S.E.2d at 53.
176. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); see supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
177. 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
178. Nevertheless, the court granted the plaintiff's request for an injunction because
the plaintiff met its burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty.
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a New York corporation, on August 21, 1985.119 The board of SCM
met on August 25 to consider alternatives to Hanson's offer. These
alternatives included finding a white knight or pursuing a leveraged buy-out. After negotiations, SCM's management reached a
leveraged buy-out agreement with Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, subject to the approval of SCM's board.18 0 Goldman Sachs
& Co., SCM's investment banker, informed the board that Merrill
Lynch's bid was fair to the shareholders. On September 3 SCM's
nine independent directors unanimously approved the agreement;
the three inside directors did not participate in the vote. On the
same day, Hanson raised its offering price above that offered by
Merrill Lynch, conditioned on SCM's refraining from granting any
person any type of lock-up device.18 1
On September 6 Merrill Lynch and SCM terminated their
original agreement and began negotiations for a new one. A proposal that included a lock-up option for Merrill Lynch to purchase
two of SCM's divisions was presented to SCM's board on September 10.182 Goldman Sachs again advised that the offer was fair, but
the board did not discuss the fair value of the two optioned businesses. The nine independent directors unanimously approved the
agreement. 88 On September 11 Hanson terminated its latest offer
and purchased twenty-five percent of SCM's stock on the open
179. Hanson, 781 F.2d at 268. The offer was $60 per share for SCM's common stock.
The SCM stock was trading at less than $50 in July 1985. Between August 1 and August 19,
however, Hanson purchased 87,000 shares of SCM stock for $54 to $56. The day after the
announcement of Hanson's offer, SCM stock closed at 641/.
180. Id. at 268-69. The agreement called for Merrill Lynch to form ML SCM Acquisitions, Inc., a corporate shell that would make a $70 cash tender offer for up to 10,500,000
SCM shares-approximately 85% of the outstanding shares. Id. at 269. The second step in
implementing the agreement gave remaining shareholders a choice between exchanging their
shares for high-risk, high-yield bonds-junk bonds-valued at $70 per share, or resorting to
their appraisal rights as provided by law. SCM management had the right to purchase up to
15% of the newly formed corporation. Merrill Lynch insisted on some assurance that it
would profit from its efforts to help SCM defeat Hanson's takeover attempts. Therefore,
SCM granted Merrill Lynch a $1.5 million engagement fee and a $9 million break-up fee,
which was to be paid if a third party acquired more than one-third of SCM's shares.
181. Id. at 270.
182. The terms of the proposal called for a $74 cash tender offer for a minimum of
two-thirds, and a maximum of four-fifths, of SCM's common stock. The second step provided that the remaining shares be exchanged for junk bonds. In exchange, SCM agreed to
put the $9 million break-up fee in escrow and paid an additional $6 million engagement fee.
The most important provision required that SCM grant Merrill Lynch an irrevocable option
to purchase SCM's Pigments and Consumer Foods divisions (the lock-up). Id. These businesses represented approximately 50% of SCM's sales. Id. at 271.
183. Id.
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market. 84 Hanson later purchased over five hundred thousand additional shares of SCM. On October 8 Merrill Lynch announced its
intention to exercise its lock-up option to purchase the two divisions. 185 Hanson brought a motion to enjoin the exercise of this
1 86
lock-up option, but the district court denied the motion.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
considered whether the business judgment rule protected the SMC
directors' decision to approve the lock-up option. The court held
that directors enjoy a presumption of propriety in making business
decisions and placed the burden of proving a breach of fiduciary
duty on the plaintiff.' The court, however, reversed the district
court and granted the plaintiff's injunction because the plaintiff
produced sufficient evidence indicating a breach of fiduciary
duty. ' The court acknowledged that directors must fulfill their
duty of care during the decisionmaking process before a court can
apply the business judgment rule to their final decision."" Thus,
the court compared SCM's directors' actions with those of Trans
Union's directors. 90 The Hanson court, like the Trans Union
court, questioned the directors' failure to obtain a valuation of
their company and their failure to read carefully the various agreements.' 91 Once the plaintiff presented prima facie evidence of a
breach of the duty of care, the burden shifted to the defendants to
justify their actions. Because the plaintiff met this initial burden,
the district court erred in not considering evidence on the value of
the optioned businesses. The defendants failed to rebut the plaintiff's evidence showing a breach of the duty of care. 92 Therefore,
because the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to raise questions regarding the propriety of the directors' actions, the court enjoined the lock-up options, fearing that the options might have re184. In Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985), the court held
that these transactions did not constitute a de facto tender offer.
185. Id. Merrill Lynch also withdrew the $9 million break-up fee that had been held in
escrow.
186. See Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 623 F.Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd
sub. nom Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisitions, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
The district court held that the business judgment rule protected the directors' decision to
grant the option.
187. Hanson, 781 F.2d at 273.
188. Id. at 283.
189. Id. at 275.
190. See supra note 65 (discussing the Trans Union directors' actions).
191. Hanson, 781 F.2d at 276.
192. Id. at 281.
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sulted in irreparable harm' 93 to SCM before the court could reach
a decision on the merits."9
The majority in Hanson held that the plaintiff has the initial
burden of showing a director's breach of fiduciary duty. This holding directly contradicts Unocal and Delaware corporation law,
which place the burden on the defendant-director. The Hanson
court's analysis, however, is similar to that used in Trans Union.'95
The court required that the directors take steps to inform themselves adequately before the business judgment rule would be applied to their ultimate decision. Thus, the plaintiff's burden of rebutting a director's presumption of propriety is not as great. To
remove the protection of the business judgment rule and place the
burden of justifying their actions on the directors, the plaintiff
merely must show that the directors did not avail themselves of
information reasonably available. 98
D. Conclusion
The above cases, like the recent Delaware cases, are not significant deviations from existing corporate law; rather, they merely
serve to clarify existing law. Hanson and Alford appear to favor
directors and officers more than Delaware law, thereby providing
evidence that Delaware actually may not be leading the "race to
the bottom." Conversely, Miller appears to approach more closely
the structural bias view. Therefore, as in Delaware, the traditional
concepts of director and officer liability survive in other jurisdictions, but with a few modifications.
193. The court stated:
Once shareholders tender into the SCM-Merrill Lynch $74 offer, the company will essentially become privately held, and Hanson would be virtually precluded from seeking
to acquire it, short of the virtually inconceivable possibility of judicial valuation and
forced sale. It certainly seems "doubtful that any damage claim against the directors
can reasonably be a meaningful alternative."
Id. at 283 (quoting Gimbel v. Signal Co., 316 A.2d 599, 603 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 316 A.2d 619
(Del. 1974)).
194. Hanson, 781 F.2d at 283.
195. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
196. Hanson, 781 F.2d at 277. The dissent expressed its displeasure with the court's
holding, stating that "while purporting to apply the business judgment rule, the majority
proceeds to engage in extensive explanation of asset valuation of the sort normally reserved
to corporate directors." Id. at 286 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
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STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS

Although judicial decisions are responsible for much of the reform in corporation law in recent years, legislators also have made
several statutory changes. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act'9 7 and the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance198 are
attempts to codify and define more clearly the standards of conduct for directors and officers. Likewise, in 1986 significant modifications in some state corporation statutes were instituted in response to the increasing impact of director and officer liability and
the apparent lack of D&O liability insurance.199
Indiana's revision of its General Corporation Act, which has
not been reviewed completely since its establishment in 1929,00 effectively eliminates the duty of care for directors. 20 The Indiana
statute, which became effective in April 1986, states that a director
will not be held liable for any action or any failure to take action
unless the director is found to have engaged in willful misconduct
or to have exhibited recklessness. 202 By adopting a willful misconduct or recklessness standard, the Indiana legislature appears to
have extended the gross negligence standard reaffirmed by recent
case law203 and clearly has forsaken the traditional common-law

standard of "that degree of care that an ordinarily prudent director or person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances. 20 4 Thus, even in the presence of gross negligence, 0 5
197.
198.

See infra Revised Model Act (Special Project).
See infra ALI Proposals (Special Project).
199. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-135-1(e) (Burns Supp. 1986); see also Futter & Gross, CharterAmendment Offers Way Out
of D&O Crisis, Legal Times, June 9, 1986, at 11; infra Insurance (Special Project) (discussing the D&O insurance crisis).

200. See Galante, Developments in Business Association Law, 19

IND.

L. REv. 67, 92

(1986).
201. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (Burns Supp. 1986). The Indiana statute
provides:
A director is not liable for any action taken as a director, or any failure to take any
action, unless:
(1) The director has breached or failed to perform the duties of the director's office
in compliance with this section; and
(2) The breach or failure to perform constitutes willful misconduct or recklessness.

Id.
202.
203.
204.

See id.; see also Futter & Gross, supra note 199.
See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
See supra An HistoricalPerspective (Special Project) note 12 and accompanying

text.
205. The fact situation presented in Trans Union is an excellent example of gross
negligence.
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directors and officers in Indiana will be free from liability.
A new provision in Delaware's General Corporation Act accomplishes the same result through a different approach. 06 The
amendment allows a corporation, in its certificate of incorporation,
to eliminate or limit liability for a director's breach of the duty of
care. 20 7 The effect of either provision is the same: if a Delaware
corporation's shareholders agree to amend the certificate of incorporation to eliminate liability for a director's breach of the duty of
care pursuant to the statute, the duty of care effectively is eliminated, thus creating a result similar to that obtained under the Indiana statute.
These statutory amendments attempt to solve the current crisis caused by the increasing liability of corporate directors and officers 208 and the decreasing availability of D&O liability insurance. 20 9 If the two statutes discussed above are an indication of
state legislatures' dissatisfaction with increased director and officer
liability, then more statutory amendments with lenient standards
may appear. 210 The legislatures' dissatisfaction stems from fear

that qualified individuals, unwilling to risk potential liability, will
206. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (b)(7) (Supp. 1986). The Delaware statute
provides:
(b) In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate of incorporation by subsection (a) of this section, the certificate of incorporation may also contain
any or all of the following matters:
(7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to
the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary
duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the
liability of a director:
(i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this Title; or (iv) for
any transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit.
Id. Thus, the new provision allows a corporation to eliminate or limit liability for a breach
of the duty of care, but not for a breach of the duty of loyalty. This result is logical because
the general measure of damages for a breach of the duty of loyalty is restitution, which
usually is less than the potentially limitless damages awarded for a breach of the duty of
care. See Futter & Gross, supra note 199, at 12.
207. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (b)(7) (Supp. 1986).
208. See Futter & Gross, supra note 199.
209. For a discussion of the current D&O liability insurance crisis, see infra Insurance
(Special Project) notes 11-19.
210. New York recently enacted an amendment to its corporation statute allowing a
corporation, in its charter, to grant directors greater indemnificaiton rights than those formerly permitted by the state's corporation statute. See infra Indemnification (Special Project) notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
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refuse to serve as directors on corporate boards.211 Because outside
directors are so vital to the functioning of the corporate governance system, it would not be surprising to see more states pass legislation addressing this issue.
PATRICIA

A.

DANIEL

211. This fear may be a result, in part, of some commentators misreading Trans
Union and other recent court decisions. See, e.g., Prickett, supra note 86 (comparing the
reaction to Trans Union to Henny-Penny's reaction ("The sky is falling!") to a pea falling
on her head).

